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This article studies representations of the 
Algerian population promoted by franco-
phone intellectuals in a context of long-
standing crisis and uncertainty. Borrow-
ing the category of symbolic analysts 
from Robert Reich, it looks at the way in 
which novelists, scholars and journalists 
try to make sense of a critical situation by 
diagnosing the culture of the Algerian 
population as deviant or backward. Aim-
ing to encourage social and political 
reform, these actors try to understand the 
characteristics of their “people,” often by 
pointing to their so-called pre-modern or 
passive behaviors. This article analyzes 
two aspects of this activity: first, attempts 
to determine who is responsible for the 
ongoing crisis, and second, the reproduc-
tion of cultural prejudices in a context of 
increased transnationalization. Moreover, 
it argues that one can interpret the politi-
cal and intellectual commitments of these 
analysts by drawing on the triad concept 
of “Naming, Blaming, Claiming,” which 
has been used to study the publicization 
of disputes. 




Between the end of March and the begin­
ning of May 2016, the Algerian journalist 
Kamal Guerroua published a series of art­
icles in the French­speaking daily newspa­
per Le Quotidien d’Oran, in which he com­
plained about the difficulty of changing 
the mentality of the Algerian people. 
Faced with what he described as a 
pathetic, fatalist and passive society, he 
asked successively: “Why can’t we 
change?,” “Are our youth really lazy?,” 
“Who must change ... and how?” and 
finally “But why are we like this?”1,2 While 
Guerroua is presented alternately as a 
scholar, a journalist or a novelist, he illus­
trates the activity of a composite social cat­
egory that participates in diagnosing the 
Algerian population. Aiming at a social 
and political reform, these actors try to 
understand the characteristics of their 
“people,” often by pointing to their so­
called pre­modern or passive behaviors.
This paper investigates the representa­
tions of the Algerian population promoted 
by francophone intellectuals in a context 
of longstanding crisis and uncertainty. 
Borrowing the category of symbolic ana­
lysts from Robert Reich, it looks at the way 
in which novelists, scholars and journalists 
try to make sense of a critical situation, 
sometimes by diagnosing the culture of 
their fellow citizens as deviant or inher­
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ently backward. For Reich, symbolic ana­
lysts are those who identify problems and 
solve them by manipulating symbols. In 
Algeria, these actors are trying to solve 
the problem of a persistent political and 
social instability in the aftermath of the 
civil war (1992­1999). In order to do so, 
they manipulate notions such as “the peo­
ple” or the “Algerian culture” to under­
stand the causes of the crisis and propose 
their own solutions. In the following 
pages, we study two aspects of this activ­
ity: first, attempts to determine who is 
responsible for the ongoing crisis, and 
second, the reproduction of cultural pre­
judices in the postcolony given a context 
of increased transnationalization. Subse­
quently, we will see how this discursive 
activity can be understood through the 
prism of the process of “Naming, Blam­
ing, Claiming” (Abel, Felstiner, and Sarat), 
a triad concept that explains the produc­
tion of public disputes.
As Guerroua’s case illustrates, the limits 
between the literary, academic and media 
fields can be especially blurry, since all of 
these fields are subsumed in the broader 
field of intellectual production. In this art­
icle, our main symbolic analysts are a nov­
elist, an academic and a journalist. They 
have all reached a level of national and 
international recognition that allow them 
to intervene regularly in public discus­
sions in Algeria and beyond. The article 
will be divided into four sections. The first 
part presents the context of the civil war 
that introduced the idea of a historical 
break and an increasing gap between 
secu lar intellectuals and the rest of the 
society. The award­winning author Rachid 
Boudjedra serves to illustrate this point. 
The second section focuses on the role of 
social scientists in the production of cul­
turalist explanations for the absence of a 
democratic transition. Here, some of the 
writings of Lahouari Addi allow us to study 
the production of a diagnosis that insists 
on national political culture to explain the 
absence of democracy. The following part 
shows that a commitment in favor of polit­
ical change also leads some analysts to 
call for a disciplinary project directed at 
the Algerian population in order to correct 
its backward behavior. To illustrate this 
point, the paper invokes recent articles 
from journalist Kamel Daoud, published 
after the Arab Spring. Finally, the last sec­
tion looks at the consequences of the 
transnationalization of these figures, as 
their analyses are appropriated and instru­
mentalized outside of Algeria.
The 1990s as a Historical Break 
To understand the production of diagno­
sis of the Algerian people by our symbolic 
analysts, one must start by looking at the 
historical context. Commentators have 
often described the gap between the uto­
pian expectations that followed indepen­
dence in 1962 and the realities of daily life, 
which was increasingly marked by perva­
sive hardship. After the end of French 
occupation, the revolutionary elites 
embodied the hope of colonized peoples 
beyond Algeria, as they were committed 
to fulfilling national independence, 
achieving economic prosperity and rede­
fining the global balance of power (Carlier 
311­16). During the rule of Houari Bou­
médiène (1965­1978), an authoritarian 
developmental state was in charge of 
organizing the economy and planning the 
country’s evolution. Internationally, Alge­
rian diplomacy was at its zenith, as its 
spokesmen advocated the forgiveness of 
Third­World debt and the nationalization 
of resources. Yet, disillusions and woes 
soon followed this early period of hope 
and ambition. A drop in oil prices and the 
subsequent economic crisis fed the dis­
enchantment of workers and students, 
resulting in a succession of strikes and 
riots at end of the 1980s and an uprising 
in October 1988 (Chikhi, “Algérie”). The 
latter marked a clear break in regard to 
the dominant conceptions of historical 
progress espoused by intellectuals from 
revolutionary or reformist backgrounds. 
The following years saw the constant 
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de gradation of the political situation and 
the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front 
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) as the main 
political party in the country. The interrup­
tion of the electoral process by the army 
in January 1992 exacerbated the tensions, 
and the country fell into a spiral of polit­
ical violence, leading to the disaggrega­
tion of the national community. At the 
same time, Algeria faced a structural 
adjustment program, the dismantlement 
of public services and an economic liber­
alization that benefited crony capitalists 
(Brahimi El Mili).
This historical context allows us to better 
grasp the position of our social category. 
Once belonging to the elite, these actors 
were suddenly confronted with increased 
competition in the intellectual field (nota­
bly by Islamist figures), a growing precar­
iousness resulting from structural adjust­
ment, and Jihadi violence against secular 
figures. Some of them left the country 
because of the war. While they had been 
trained to become a vanguard leading the 
way to social and intellectual advance­
ment, they were brutally confronted with 
the crisis experienced by the country dur­
ing the 1980s­1990s (El Kenz). Conse­
quently, the subsequent diagnoses con­
cerning the culture of the Algerian people 
are a way of understanding this apparent 
historical failure, rather than a form of dis­
dain for the masses.
During the civil war, Algeria witnessed the 
development of a descriptive literature 
that analyzes the mental state of the 
popu lation and the supposed illnesses of 
the country (corruption, violence, funda­
mentalism). This tendency was high­
lighted by the rise of a new generation of 
authors, such as Yasmina Khadra and 
Boualem Sansal, who excelled in the 
genre of the crime novel—a kind of writing 
that is well­suited to describing psycho­
logical and cultural deviance. In their 
works published at the end of the 1990s, 
both of these writers described a society 
tortured by paranoia, intolerance, histori­
cal confusion and cynicism (Khadra; 
Sansal). While very different in style, both 
Khadra and Sansal were products of the 
developmental state’s elite schools in the 
1970s; Khadra was trained in Cherchell’s 
military academy, and Sansal graduated 
from the Polytechnic School of Algiers. As 
such, they were confronted with the gap 
between official promises and the reality 
of crisis. While they described a patho­
logical and morbid society, they also 
remembered a lost normalcy, thus laying 
a potential foundation on which to rebuild 
the polity (Naudillon).
When participating in public debates, our 
symbolic analysts assume their own 
responsibility as intellectuals and, at the 
same time, they search to attribute blame 
at the national level in terms of finding 
those whose moral and political failures 
have brought the country to crisis (Mil­
stein). This investment in politics is espe­
cially evident for a novelist such as Rachid 
Boudjedra. A former nationalist militant 
during the war of independence, the nov­
elist born in 1941 was ostracized by the 
regime for a few years in the 1960s before 
returning to Algeria. Writing both in 
French and in Arabic, he became a major 
figure in the national literary field and a 
close counselor of many ministers situated 
to the left of the ruling coalition. Yet, the 
victory of the FIS during the legislative 
elections of December 1991 endangered 
him both as an individual associated with 
the governing elite and as a secular intel­
lectual. In 1992, a few months after the mil­
itary coup, Boudjedra published a pam­
phlet entitled “FIS de la haine,” in which he 
moved away from his position as a novelist 
to offer a stylized but nonetheless virulent 
account of the country’s political situation.
As a communist, Boudjedra had often cri­
ticized the conservatism of Algerian soci­
ety. Yet, with the fall of the USSR and the 
rise of Islamism, he abandoned his prior 
investment in the dichotomy between 
progress and archaism for a new under­
standing that counterposed modernity to 
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archaism (Chikhi, “Islamisme”). This con­
ceptual break implied a shift toward a 
more inquisitorial tone. In his pamphlet, 
he pointed to three kinds of responsibility 
in order to understand the Algerian crisis. 
First, he accused a neocolonial “fran­
cophony” of erasing the diversity and sin­
gularity of Algerian culture and promoting 
the FIS on its satellite TVs (Boudjedra, 
23­27). Second, he blamed a corrupted 
state for bringing a “culture of laziness and 
inertia” to the people (67). These politics 
made possible the rise of Algerian neo­
fundamentalists, described by Boudjedra 
as a minority of mentally defective fascists 
whose political program was limited to 
violence and regression (16, 111). In other 
words, our symbolic analyst identified 
those who led a large part of the popula­
tion to endorse what he understood as a 
backward politico­religious program. 
Culture and Politics
The protean crisis experienced by Algeria 
from the 1980s onward stimulated the 
activity of the symbolic analysts, as they 
were also compelled to find new ways to 
speak of the community. In order to study 
the trajectory of the country after Bou­
médiène’s death in 1978, they sought to 
develop a new understanding of the world 
that would move away from Third­Worldist 
dogma. Their attempt to explain and 
reconceptualize the country’s situation 
brings us back to the first etymology of the 
notion of crisis, the Greek krisis which 
refers to a moment of judgment, of dis­
tinction, of construction of the criteria use­
ful in order to allow a renewed under­
standing of the situation (Cristias 7). In 
other terms, the troubled period of the 
1980s and 1990s fed the demand for a 
para digm shift.
At the end of the 1990s, a dominant con­
ceptual toolkit was available for whom­
ever wanted to think about political 
upheavals. The narrative of democratiza­
tion based on the global expansion of an 
Anglo­Saxon liberal model was widely 
propagated during the period of the so­
called “third wave.” In fact, in Algeria the 
period of extreme violence followed a 
political opening that partially matched 
this model. At the end of the Black Decade, 
some longstanding specialists of the 
region remained hopeful that the erosion 
of the authoritarian model could give birth 
to a genuine democratic transition 
(Quandt; Leveau). Yet, a few years later, the 
persisting influence of the military, the vio­
lent repression of the Kabyle uprising of 
2001 and the struggles at the top of the 
state between the new president 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika and his prime minis­
ter Ali Benflis demonstrated the inade­
quacy of this wishful thinking. Rather, 
Algerian scholars underlined the continua­
tion of the “political, security and eco­
nomic crisis” after the end of the civil war 
(Bennadji).
This “failed” transition, coupled with the 
memory of the civil war, led certain social 
scientists to develop an analysis blaming 
a “patriarchal culture,” which was unsuited 
to the rule of law and perpetuated “tradi­
tional segmental structures,” for the 
behavior of the ruling elite and the popu­
lation (Remaoun). Slowly but surely, inter­
pretations based on a form of cultural evo­
lutionism began to flourish in the academic 
field. The example of Lahouari Addi is par­
ticularly interesting in this regard—pre­
cisely because of his intellectual commit­
ment to anti­essentialist approaches. 
Primarily trained as a sociologist of rural 
societies, Addi later moved his field of 
interest to the political sphere, as he pre­
pared his doctorat d’état in France at the 
École des Hautes Études en Science Soci­
ales.3 Working notably on questions of 
populism and power in Algeria, he 
became a commentator on the country’s 
latest political events, and his informed 
opinion continues to regularly appear in 
Algerian newspapers.4
Addi’s interest in anthropologists studying 
the Maghreb—such as Gellner and Geertz—
allows him to reflect the refutation of 
essentialist analysis regarding the role of 
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Islam in contemporary Muslim society and 
to advocate for a socio­historical approach 
(Deux antrophologues). At the same time, 
he focuses on the development of an 
Algerian political culture, at the crossroads 
of traditional structures, the war of inde­
pendence and French modernist influ­
ence. According to him, this culture pro­
duces specific representations of the state 
and explains the rise of the FIS as well as 
persisting populism and political violence. 
While refusing an approach that would 
disqualify a reified Islam or Arab culture, 
he develops an analysis based on various 
myths associated with liberal democracy 
(sovereignty of the voters, openness of 
electoral competition, empty space of 
power). Conversely, he opposes this ideal 
system based on representation and rule 
of law to a disorganized Algerian society 
prone to rioting where political power is 
privatized and cannot fully emancipate 
itself from a medieval form of religious 
control (“Les partis politiques”). Addi is 
certainly not the only political analyst to 
take for granted this mythology of the 
“good democratic system.” Nevertheless, 
what is especially telling is that his refuta­
tion of essential difference leads to an 
analysis based on cultural evolutionism: 
“State power in Algeria is vacant be­
cause there are no ideological mecha­
nisms to return it to its owner: society. 
This is the reason for the failure of the 
regime, which is not because of the 
wrong model or the wrong-headed 
implementation of a more or less co-
herent economic policy [emphasis 
added]. It is about political represen­
tations where the individual, as a sub­
ject of law, does not exist, and where 
the group is sublimated by a discourse 
of the leader, who enjoys an external 
authority. This is like the old traditional 
political order that negates the political 
and considers the leader as a man who 
rights the wrong rather than some­
one who protects individual freedom. 
We must overcome a culture based 
on justice and replace it with a culture 
based on freedom [emphasis added].” 
(L’Algérie d’hier 74­75)
This excerpt illustrates a change in the 
diagnosis proposed by symbolic analysts. 
While Boudjedra focused on the external 
and internal actors responsible for the 
backwardness of the population, Addi 
suggests that cultural reform is necessary 
in order to solve the country’s issues and 
encourage a transition towards modern 
political behavior. Yet, there is a distinc­
tion to be made between academics and 
other analysts, thus introducing a nuance 
in our meta­category. While Addi’s writ­
ings are too careful to employ orientalist 
clichés, many of his contemporaries are 
less cautious. Thus, observers in the daily 
press often propose anthropological 
readings of politics in Bouteflika’s Algeria 
that point to “local mentalities” and their 
so­called pathological consequences 
(violence, superstition, corruption, sub­
mission to the leader).5 
Changing the Regime and the People
Cultural evolutionism is common in Alge­
rian public debates. By promoting a vision 
where the characteristics of the “people” 
explain the persisting corrupt, paternalis­
tic and violent nature of the political order, 
symbolic analysts reproduce the older 
notion of “colonizability.” Malek Bennabi, 
a sociologist and philosopher born in 
Constantine who notably studied the rela­
tionship between Islamic culture and 
modernity, coined this term in the 1970s. 
His idea of colonizability explains under­
development and colonization by invok­
ing a backward understanding of religion 
and social inertia. Consequently, he also 
advocated for cultural and religious 
reform in order to promote a Muslim 
renewal in Algeria (Bennabi). Bennabi’s 
reflection displaces responsibility for the 
colonial occupation from the imperial 
power, France, to the occupied people. 
The philosopher remained influential after 
his death in 1973. Not only was Bennabi a 
reference for the djazʾara, an elitist Islamist 
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trend inside of the FIS (Labat 75­78), he 
was also an inspiration for a political and 
cultural movement launched by Noured­
dine Boukrouh at the end of the 1980s. His 
heirs are still currently active, most notably 
in the liberal political party Jil Jadid (“New 
Generation”). During Boukrouh’s political 
career, he experimented with various 
strategies in order to promote socio­polit­
ical reform. After joining Bouteflika’s early 
governments as a minister, he subse­
quently returned to his first love: writing 
critical analysis of Algerian politics. One of 
his last essays has an eloquent title: 
“Reforming People and Power” (Réformer 
peuple et pouvoir, 2013). Indeed, the idea 
that in order to end the political deadlock, 
one has to change the people first, 
remains a widely shared trope among 
Algerian intellectual elites.
This last point brings us to our third sym­
bolic analyst, renowned editorial writer 
(and novelist) Kamel Daoud, who was 
born in 1970. Since beginning his career in 
the middle of the 1990s, the journalist from 
Oran has been a vocal critic of the Alge­
rian regime. His daily column, published 
in the Quotidien d’Oran under the title 
Raïna Raïkum (“Our opinion, your opin­
ion”), has allowed him to denounce the 
corruption and the violence of the ruling 
elite, and the general absurdity of the 
political order. In 2013, he publicly ques­
tioned the anarchic depiction of the peo­
ple proposed by minister of Interior 
Dahou Ould Kabia, accusing him of acting 
in a colonial fashion. The following year, he 
published a short paper addressed to 
Bouteflika predicting that the president 
would be lynched by his own people if he 
ran for a fourth term.6
A firm opponent of the regime, Daoud 
participated in the protests of January 
2011, in the aftermath of the Tunisian revo­
lution. Yet, despite his commitment in 
favor of democracy (or precisely because 
of it), Daoud’s editorials have become 
more and more directed at the Algerian 
population. In his daily column, he started 
to cast the people as guilty for the political 
deadlock. After initially calling for the fall 
of the regime, he then regarded the vic­
tory of the Islamists in the first elections in 
Tunisia and in Egypt with hostility, going 
so far as to ask if “Arabs (were) ready for 
democracy?”7 From this perspective, he 
demonstrates the contradiction of a liberal 
discourse on democracy that considers 
conservative or progressive liberalism as 
the only rightful form of democratic gov­
ernment. Undoubtedly, his personal expe­
riences as a former Islamist sympathizer as 
well as a journalist who has directly faced 
the consequences of Jihadi violence must 
be taken into account. His criticism regard­
ing the inability of Algerians and Arabs to 
act as “real democrats” draws on his 
denunciation of a social conservatism that 
he perceives to be one of the main ills 
afflicting the country. Moreover, in addi­
tion to his critique of Islam and his defense 
of women’s rights, he also depicts a popu­
lation unfit for a modern economy, uncivil 
and dirty. In an editorial published in May 
2014, just after Bouteflika’s reelection, he 
rejected what he labeled a form of “ange­
lism” and “emotional populism” and advo­
cated for a reform of the population:
“Many find their happiness in sub-
mission, in devouring and in corrup-
tion [emphasis added]. Few are those 
who think about future generations or 
collective interests. This is the equa­
tion that must be changed, this is the 
responsibility that we have to accept 
and demonstrate. Speaking continu­
ously of a people who are victims and 
“treacherous intellectuals” has now be­
come an annoyingly easy option. What 
must be changed is this people, these 
individuals [emphasis added]. We must 
explain what is a resignation and what 
is a constitution. We must demonstrate 
that creating jobs is better than build­
ing more mosques. That work is a duty. 
That effort is glory. That public spirit is 
not naivety.” (“Oui, il faut changer”)
This editorial illustrates Daoud’s belief that 
public discussions must now be reori­
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ented given the failed attempts to change 
the political order. Defending the right of 
intellectuals to be critical of the popula­
tion, he advocates for a social­cultural 
aggiornamento in order to instill civic val­
ues into the social body. In so doing, he 
echoes a widely shared position among 
Algerian symbolic analysts in favor of a 
reform of the education system. At the 
same time, he endorses the idea that one 
should teach the values of modern market 
economy to the masses, since they are 
desperately lazy. In short, he proposes a 
disciplinary undertaking in order to cor­
rect popular backwardness. 
A Postcolonial and Transnational Configu-
ration
In addition to the various difficulties that 
these intellectuals faced during the 1990s, 
one must also consider the history of their 
political commitments to understand their 
critical relationship to the “people.” For 
example, writers have faced the moral, 
religious or linguistic criteria imposed by 
the authoritarian state. In response, their 
political fight has favored a moral and 
political liberalism rather than a commit­
ment to democracy (Leperlier). At the 
same time, to fully grasp the conse­
quences of these narratives on the Alge­
rian people, it is useful to look at the post­
colonial and transnational dimensions of 
this phenomenon. When Daoud describes 
the Algerian people as “three­quarters 
ignorant, careless of the land that will be 
handed down [to the next generation], 
bigoted, dirty, uncivil” (“Pourquoi les 
Algériens”), one is immediately struck by 
the similarity with the vocabulary once 
used to describe the colonized masses. In 
his afterword to the Wretched of the Earth, 
the nationalist militant and historian 
Mohamed Harbi underlines the persisting 
prejudice regarding the apathetic and 
anarchic masses after independence, this 
time held not by French colonists, but 
Algerian revolutionaries (308). This dualist 
imagery counterposing a reformist elite to 
a backward population reproduces a fic­
tion of “modernization from above” that 
was colonial in origin (Pitt), before becom­
ing a marker of postcoloniality. 
These narratives of backwardness also rely 
on the rejection of the Islamist model and 
a commitment to a liberal ideal, which 
invokes rationality, civility, and efficiency, 
as a superior form of modernity. The rejec­
tion of an allegedly pre­modern political 
culture can be traced back to the ethno­
centrism underlying liberal thought 
(Abdel­Nour). From this perspective, the 
development of an approach based on 
cultural evolutionism is certainly related to 
a—sometimes forced—insertion in a global­
ized space where this normative model is 
largely promoted. Working in contact with 
European or American environments, our 
symbolic analysts appropriate and trans­
form some of the values that are often 
viewed as so­called benchmarks of West­
ern modernity, such as secularism or gen­
der mixity. It is especially noticeable for 
French­speaking intellectuals, who are 
more easily inserted in the northern shore 
of the Mediterranean. Tellingly, Kamel 
Daoud publishes his op­eds in renowned 
Western newspapers such as La Repub-
blica, Le Monde and the New York Times. 
After teaching in France, Lahouari Addi 
also spent a couple of years in the United 
States, in prestigious universities such as 
Princeton and Georgetown. Even the nov­
elist Rachid Boudjedra, who belongs to an 
older generation and remained a fervent 
communist, was forced to find refuge in 
France in the 1960s. For linguistic, political 
and professional reasons, French­speak­
ing symbolic analysts are exposed to the 
normative claims that come with an ethno­
centric mythology of modernity. Subse­
quently, they further reinterpret these 
principles according to their own political 
agendas and social strategies.
The coupling of the postcolonial and 
transnational aspects of this configuration 
is evident when we look at the way in 
which some of our actors have been wel­
comed in France. For French­speaking 
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Algerian writers, the former imperial 
power remains the place for international 
recognition, where prominent novelists 
such as Boudjedra, Khadra or Sansal have 
been awarded various prizes. Neverthe­
less, when reproduced in a different space, 
their discourses change in meaning. For 
example, in the Algerian context, Boudje­
dra criticized not only the Islamists, but 
also the regime and French neo­colonial­
ism. Yet in the French context, he appeared 
as a spokesman for the critique of the 
Muslim religion, a faith associated with 
fundamentalist threats and with the sensi­
tive issue of the veil, while all but ignoring 
his criticism of the West.8 After the publica­
tion of his pamphlet, Boudjedra became 
an epitome of resistance to Islamic fanati­
cism and was compared to Zola and Vol­
taire. His criticism of Islam and appropria­
tion of modernist values allowed French 
journalists to portray him as a promoter of 
Enlightenment ideas in a country doomed 
by backward forces. In other terms, the 
discourse was reinterpreted from the van­
tage point of the former métropole; while 
initially produced in a predominantly Mus­
lim society, it was then appropriated in a 
French context of national anxieties and 
racial prejudice.
A similar phenomenon occurred in the 
recent Daoud polemic. In 2013, the jour­
nalist published his first novel, a narration 
of L’Etranger told from the perspective of 
the brother of the Arab killed by Meur­
sault, Camus’ hero. This novel was warmly 
welcomed in France, where Daoud was 
praised as a “new Camus,” an aura that 
was reinforced when an Algerian Salafist 
imam launched a fatwa against the jour­
nalist in late 2014. While the preacher was 
later sentenced to jail, these threats 
revived the memories of the civil war and 
reinforced Daoud’s position as a leading 
figure of the Algerian “democratic” intel­
ligentsia. At the beginning of 2016, follow­
ing the events in Cologne,9 he published 
a series of articles in the international 
press in which he proposed his diagnostic 
on the pathological relationship to sex 
existing in the “world of Allah” before sug­
gesting that one should change the soul 
of the migrants (“Cologne, lieu de fan­
tasmes”). Though the author analyzed an 
event that occurred in Europe and was 
directed at a Western audience, his prose 
was nonetheless marked by his own polit­
ical commitment against puritanical 
forces in Algeria. While the article sparked 
some criticism, it was also met with wide 
support in the French press, in which 
Daoud was portrayed as a free spirit advo­
cating for reform in a backward environ­
ment. In this context, it is worth noting that 
another of our symbolic analysts, Lah­
ouari Addi, underlined the risks associ­
ated with this transnational configuration. 
In a text published for the French news 
website Mediapart, he suggested that 
despite his accurate depiction of the situ­
ation in Muslim countries, Daoud had 
transgressed a “methodological border” 
by applying the same analytical frame for 
Muslims in Europe, thus providing ideo­
logical fodder for the European far right 
(“L’Ecrivain­journaliste”). Indeed, while the 
critique produced by our analysts in Alge­
ria aims at changing the political and 
social order, it can be appropriated in 
France in order to promote Islamophobic 
agendas. In the former métropole, their 
Algerian origin serves to legitimize preex­
isting racial prejudice, as they become 
what Vincent Geisser labeled as “alibi 
Muslim intellectuals.”
Conclusion: Naming, Blaming, Claiming in 
the Postcolony
This paper has studied how symbolic ana­
lysts explain the political situation in Alge­
ria in the aftermath of the civil war of the 
1990s and given the persistent corruption 
and authoritarianism under Bouteflika. In 
offering a diagnosis of the Algerian peo­
ple, they participate in public discussions 
and attempt to remedy the longstanding 
political and economic crisis faced by the 
polity. In order to better grasp the changes 
of their diagnosis over time, one can look 
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at their political and intellectual commit­
ment through an analytical frame used for 
studying the publicization of disputes, 
based on the triad concept of “Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming” (Abel, Felstiner, and 
Sarat). The first term, “naming,” indicates 
the need to identify the problem and to 
frame it as a matter of public interest. From 
this perspective, we can see that the coun­
try’s issues are increasingly framed in cul­
tural rather than economic or political 
terms. As culture becomes the main causal 
factor for the crisis, the second discursive 
function of the dispute sees the redirec­
tion of the blame from dominant powers 
(the regime, the neo­colonial West) or 
specific groups (the Islamists) to the gen­
eral population. Our symbolic analysts 
invoke the childish or pathological behav­
ior of the masses in order to explain cor­
ruption, violence, economic inefficiency or 
lack of democracy. Finally, they claim that 
changing the people’s culture is crucial to 
ending the polit ical deadlock; they advo­
cate social reform rather than revolution, 
and view the latter as dangerous given the 
unpreparedness of the masses. Unsurpris­
ingly, they uphold education and culture 
as two areas of priority for public policies, 
in order to shape a modern population.
This call for social reform is different from 
attempts at cultural renewal that occurred 
at the end of the colonial period. Instead 
of invoking “indigenous” traits (Islam, Ber­
ber or Arab identity), it draws inspiration 
from liberal standards of reform and 
echoes prejudices against a local culture 
that now appears to be unfit for a modern 
polity. It goes without saying that a long­
standing crisis is reflected in certain cul­
tural habits that merit analysis, but it is 
important not to view the symptoms as if 
they were the cause. Yet, we have seen 
that our symbolic analysts can also repro­
duce a fiction of cultural exception and 
social backwardness. In so doing, they 
legitimize both local and foreign interven­
tions aimed at correcting the masses and 
improving the country’s “human capital.” 
Focusing on the population’s behaviors 
and beliefs not only echoes persistent 
racial prejudices inside and outside of the 
postcolony. It also erases the geopolitical 
and historical factors as well as the global 
economic structures that explain the Alge­
rian configuration. Finally, limiting the 
causes of social, economic and political 
imbalances to local cultural factors indi­
rectly legitimizes the transformative 
dynamics associated with neoliberal 
restructuring.
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9 On New Year’s Eve, an 
unprecedented wave of 
aggressions—some of them 
sexual in nature—struck 
Germany and especially 
Cologne. Many of the 
identified suspects were of 
North­African origin, others 
were refugees. 
Notes
1 All quotes in this article have 
been translated to English by 
the authors.
2 See the articles published 
by Kamal Guerroua in Le 
Quotidien d’Oran.
3 A doctorat d’état is a degree 
coming after the PhD for 
advanced professors.
4 See the interviews where he 
comments on the opposition 
to Bouteflika’s fourth 
reelection (“L’Opposition 
de Médiène”) or the 
replacement of the head 
of the secret services 
(“Bouteflika”).
5 On the culture of violence, 
see for example articles from 
Salaheddine Menia or Arezki 
Ighemat, both holding a PhD.
6 See respectively “La 
Civilisation et l’anarchie” and 
“Honte à toi.”
7 See “Les Arabes sont­il 
mûrs.”
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